by clear-cut uniform conflicts rules. To me, therefore, freedom of choice in conflicts law can only be explained by linking it to freedom of disposition in substantive law. Where party autonomy is given free reign in the forum's domestic law, its national conflicts law is likely to allow a choice of law by the parties. Conversely, freedom of choice is likely to be denied in areas in which the corresponding substantive law is meant to protect third parties or public interests and therefore is couched in mandatory language. That is why the law governing marriage, parentage, adoption, parental responsibility, or rights in rem can generally not be chosen by the parties. On the other hand, where a dispute does not concern anyone but the litigants -which usually implies that they are free to resort to alternative means of dispute resolution -there is no reason to curb their freedom to choose the applicable law.
That is why party autonomy is now generally accepted as a leading principle in contracts choice of w.
ransaction, 11 the legitimation f a child born out of wedlock, 12 or the obligation to pay maintenance.
la
As a tenet of the choice-of-law method adopted in most legal systems in the world today, party autonomy is an anomaly. At any rate, a method that is supposed to designate the law of the country with which the legal relationship at issue is most closely connected should not leave room for the parties to choose a law that does not qualify as such. Yet, we have come to accept that the closest connection is not the only criterion by which the applicable law may be selected. Apart from conflicts rules based on the principle of the closest connection and the principle of party autonomy, there are at least two different kinds of rules that are not meant to determine the 'center of gravity' or the geographical 'seat' of the legal relationship. Instead, they give expression to a social policy underlying the forum's substantive law, which is either translated into a connecting factor that focuses on the party in need of protection, or into a number of alternative references, with a preference for the one by which a specific goal can be achieved. 9 Choice-of-law rules focusing on consumers, employees, children, maintenance creditors, etc. could be said to reflect the function of the corresponding substantive law, which is protection of the weaker party. They are based, therefore, on a choice-of-law principle that is known as the 'principle of functional allocation,' or the 'protection principle'. 
Party autonomy as defined in the Rome II Regulation
n of the parties' power to dispose of their rights nder substantive law to the level of conflicts law.
erce. For the rest, Article 4 is essentially the same as Article 10 in the Commission's first proposal.
14 According to the preamble of the Rome II Regulation, a rule allowing the parties to choose the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation is based on two objectives: 'to respect the principle of party autonomy and to enhance legal certainty'. This rationale is not very convincing, as it does not answer the questions of why party autonomy should be respected, or why a choice by the parties would lead to greater certainty than the one to be achieved by the Regulation's uniform conflicts rules. At any rate, the preamble does not explain why the parties should be allowed to choose the law of a country that is not in any way connected with the non-contractual obligation at issue. Such freedom of choice can only be understood if it is viewed as a transpositio u It would seem that the main provision on party autonomy in Rome II, Article 14 in its final version, has not given rise to much debate, as all the elements of the Commission's original proposal have remained basically intact. The parties' freedom to choose the applicable law is still subject to a number of restrictions: (1) the choice-of-law agreement must be entered into after the event giving rise to the damage occurred; (2) the choice must be express, or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the circumstances of the case; (3) it may not affect the rights of third parties; (4) in domestic cases, a choice of foreign law cannot displace the mandatory provisions of the law that would apply without the choice; (5) in intra-community cases, the choice of the law of a non-member state cannot displace mandatory provisions of Community law; (6) the choice of a foreign law cannot displace overriding mandatory rules of the forum, and (8) a choice-of-law agreement does not affect the law applicable to non-contractual obligations arising from an infringement of intellectual property rights, as designated by Article 8. In the final text of the Regulation, a similar restriction has been included with respect to unfair competition and restrictive trade practices, both covered by Article 6. Another novelty is the exception to the first restriction if all parties concerned are engaged in comm 1 There are some minor differences in wording ('shall' instead of 'must', 'where' instead of 'if', etc.), as well as some legal differences. In the Commission's proposal, the agreement would only be valid if the parties entered into it 'after their dispute arose.' Article 14 now provides: 'after the event giving rise to the damage occu 14.
rred.' The time factor in Article 10(2) and 10(3) -all elements located in one state or in one or more member states -has been changed from 'at the time when the loss was sustained' into 'when the event giving rise to the damage occurs.' junction with the reference to 'competitive relations and collective interests of consumers' in Article 6(1), this statement suggests that unfair competition and restrictive trade practices affect public rather 15 . Article 14(2) referring to situations in which a choice of foreign law is the only foreign element. The occurrence, the resulting loss, the habitual residence of the parties, etc. are all located in one and the same country, but not the country whose law was chosen. On that occasion, the relation between party autonomy and environmental law should be reconsidered as well. Article 7, the provision on the law applicable to environmental damage, calls for the application of the law of the place of injury, or -at the victim's option -the (probably more favorable) law of the place of conduct wrong. Since protection of the environment would seem to be no less a public interest of the state concerned than protection against unfair competition or restrictive trade practices, I
fail to see why Article 7 does not also contain a restriction on a choice by both parties similar to the one laid down in Article 6(4). The same could be said with regard to the provision covering industrial actions: Article 9 refers to the lex loci delicti, subject to the common habitual residence exception of 21. Laws that are meant to protect trade and commerce from restraints, monopolies, price-fixing, price discrimination, etc.
(antitrust laws) qualify as 'overriding mandatory rules' within the meaning of Article 9(1) of the latest draft of the Rome I Regulation, as they are crucial to the 'political, social, or economic organisation' of the country in which they are in force. However, Rome II only gives precedence to overriding mandatory provisions of the forum state (Article 16). If choice-of-law agreements were allowed under Article 6, the parties could evade the rules of foreign competition law, whether or not they would qualify as overriding mandatory provisions. Article 4(2), but it does not rule out choice-of-law agreements. Still, it would seem that industrial actions affect social and economic interests of a higher order than those of the parties concerned, justifying a restriction on party autonomy similar to the one included in Article 6(4).
No freedom of choice in cases relating to infringement of intellectual property rights
It is generally assumed that the territorial nature of intellectual property rights does not support application of any other law but the law of the country for which protection is claimed (lex loci protectionis). 23 Hence, the Rome II Regulation neither leaves room for the law of the parties' common habitual residence, nor provides for a proper law exception. Choice-of-law agreements are expressly meant to exclude the unlawfulness issue from the scope of choice-of-law agreements. 26 While I would not limit the parties' options to a choice of lex fori, there is much to be said for an approach in which the legal consequences of infringement could be subjected either to the law of the country with which they are most closely connected (lex domicilii communis, proper law, or accessory choice of law), rather than the lex loci protectionis, or to the law chosen by the parties.
Freedom of choice before or after the event
The last restriction on party autonomy I should like to discuss is the one laid down in Article 14(1),
requiring that choice-of-law agreements between non-professional parties are entered into after the event giving rise to the damage occurred. Similar restrictions can be found in, e.g., the German, Belgian, and Swiss statutes on private international law. 27 It would seem that they all rest on the same rationale, which is: preventing abuse of choice-of-law agreements where the parties do not have equal bargaining power. 28 Whether or not such fear of abuse is justified, it should be borne in mind that most choice-of-law agreements covering an anticipated tort are made in connection with a contractual relationship between the parties. They -or at least one of them -want to make sure that the law of their choice will be applied to any dispute that may arise as a result of their relationship, regardless of whether the action sounds in contract or in tort. Even if their agreement would be invalid under Article 14(1), an action sounding in tort would still be governed by the law of their choice, as there is likely to be a close connection between their contractual relationship and the tort at issue, 29 the situation expressly mentioned in Article 4(3). In other words, even if a choice-of-law agreement would be invalid because it was entered into before the event giving rise to the damage occurred, it would be replaced by an accessory choice of the (chosen) lex contractus. 30 The remaining cases -those in which the parties have entered into an agreement on the law applicable to a future tort while they are not bound by a pre-existing relationship -will be so rare that they hardly warrant the elaborate distinction between anterior and posterior agreements formulated in Article 14(1)(a) and (b).
Still, this concern for the plight of the weaker party reveals another flaw in the methodological underpinnings of the regulation. If an imbalance in the parties' bargaining power should be remedied by a provision like Article 14(1) -which would seem to be based on the same rationale as the one underlying the validity of forum selection clauses in insurance contracts, consumer contracts, and contracts of employment under the Brussels I Regulation 31 -it is hard to see why 'non-commercial parties' should not be given the opportunity to rely on an anterior choice-of-law agreement if that would benefit their case, just like the Brussels I Regulation allows the weaker party to rely on an anterior choice-of-forum agreement.
On a more fundamental level, it could be asked whether the desire to protect the weaker party, as ex- There is a methodological discrepancy, therefore, between provisions in Rome II that are meant to further substantive policies -such as the protection of public interests in Article 6, or the protection of the weaker party in Article 14(1) -and those that remain totally blind to the result they achieve, despite the token remarks on the function of modern tort law in the Explanatory Memorandum and the preamble.
Conclusion
The practical import of a provision on choice-of-law agreements in the area of non-contractual obligations is undoubtedly limited. Where disputes arise between parties that are not bound by a pre-existing relationship, they have little cause to agree on a law that could put one of them at a disadvantage. Still, the Rome II Regulation would be incomplete without a provision on party autonomy and its limitations. Article 14 allows the parties to choose any law they want -not necessarily the lex fori or the law of one of the countries with which the case is in some way connected. Unless both parties are engaged in commercial activities, a valid agreement can only be made after the event giving rise to the damage occurred, a restriction meant to protect the interests of the weaker party. Collective interests are deemed to be affected by infringements of national or Community competition law, hence the ban on choice-of-law agreements in Article 6(4). A similar prohibition can be found in Article 8(3). The latter restriction does not seem to be warranted by a concern for public interests but -more likely -by an outdated choice-of-law approach to disputes over the infringement of intellectual property rights.
Studying the various drafts and the final version of the Rome II Regulation, one can hardly escape the impression that it has come to be based on rather disparate choice-of-law considerations, ranging from the need for uniformity, predictability, and legal certainty to 'the function of modern tort law, the protection of 'public interests,' and a concern for 'weaker parties'. But even if methodological eclecticism is a characteristic of contemporary choice of law, consistency is required in assessing the choice-oflaw objective to be achieved in a particular area, and in choosing the choice-of-law technique best suited to achieve it. Thus, if collective interests call for a ban on choice-of-law agreements, party autonomy should be ruled out in all areas in which such interests are at stake. If the exclusion of ex ante agreements is deemed to be justified by the interests of the weaker party, an exception should be made for cases in which the weaker party wants to rely on such an agreement. And, generally, if the main rule in Rome II is said to be supported by 'the compensatory function of modern tort law', it
should not 'strike a fair balance between the interests of the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining damage,' as it says in recital 16; rather, it should focus on the person to be compensated. To me, these inconsistencies are illustrative of a general lack of awareness of the bedrock of modern ferred to the law of the victim's habitual residence, a clear example of functional allocation. The current version is based on a 'cascade system of connecting factors, together with a foreseeability clause' (recital 20).
